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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The current procurement system for asphalt pavement used by the 
Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) utilizes a competitive sealed proposal 
with the contract awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Cost control 
continues to play a fundamental role throughout the pavement construction 
process. The contractor purchases materials from a supplier, who is also often 
the lowest bidder. As paving materials move through the contractor’s equipment, 
binder and aggregate are tested by the contractor, by NDOR personnel and/or by 
independent quality control technicians. Deficiencies in workmanship or material 
quality result in monetary penalties levied against the contractor. The contractor 
often passes these penalties onward to the material supplier.  
NDOR currently has in-place a system of incentives to reimburse 
contractors for pavement quality based upon indices measured at completion of 
construction. For asphalt pavement, problems resulting from materials or 
construction techniques used often do not become apparent until one to three 
years after construction has been completed.  The system currently used by the 
NDOR lacks incentives to encourage use of materials or construction techniques 
which might significantly improve the long-term quality of asphalt pavement. 
This research investigated the advantages of creating a system of 
incentives to reward contractors for producing asphalt pavement with good long-
term (one to three years) performance characteristics. It evaluated several 
pavement performance indices to determine which were most reflective of long-
term asphalt pavement performance and examined the concept of awarding 
specific monetary incentives to pavement contractors based upon levels of 
performance indicators at various points during pavement lifespan. 
This research also analyzed various existing and experimental incentive 
programs, with the objective of developing one or more performance-based 
incentives that the NDOR could use for contractors providing asphalt pavement 
to the State of Nebraska. Since the NDOR already has an incentive system 
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keyed to specific indices measured immediately after completion of construction, 
the proposed incentive program is based upon indices measured later in 
pavement life. Various quality indices (International Roughness Index, rutting, 
cracking, etc.) measured annually by the NDOR were evaluated for their potential 
to serve as indicators of pavement quality one to three years after construction.  
The performance incentive system proposed allows contractors to receive full 
contract payment for pavement built to construction specifications. The system 
will subsequently provide an additional monetary incentive at a specified interval 
to contractors who produce pavement that continues to meet or exceed 
established quality standards. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION SEARCH 
 
Performance measures consist of assessment data that strongly, directly, 
or quantitatively reflect the degree to which specific results meet the needs and 
expectations of the customer. These measures are often compared to goals or 
benchmarks, so remedial actions can be initiated when benchmarks are not 
being met. Performance indicators, on the other hand, are data that suggest 
general alignment of results with customer goals. Indicators are typically direct or 
surrogate measures for the actual performance characteristics of interest.  
Indicators can be useful in identifying trends in overall performance, as well as 
for actual comparison to a desired goal. Performance measures can be 
aggregated from local to state to regional to national levels. Some performance 
measures may even at allow an agency to be compared with other agencies, if a 
measure based on cost is used (Richter 2004). 
 
2.1  How Does the NDOR Measure Pavement Quality?  
 The NDOR measures quality of asphalt pavement by the use of means 
and method specifications, the application of quality assurance specifications and 
through NDOR evaluations of quality at the completion of construction.  Quality of 
asphalt pavement is not measured by NDOR through performance related 
specifications or warranties (OPA 2006). 
  The NDOR conducts almost continuous assessment of quality throughout 
the lifetime of a pavement.  Numerous indicators are measured and recorded 
annually for each section of highway throughout the network.  The NDOR’s 
Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction (2007) lists 
some of these indicators including: 
 
Roughness (IRI): The roughness or International Roughness Index (IRI) is a 
measure of pavement smoothness commonly recorded in vertical millimeters per 
lateral meter. 
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 Cracking Index: This is a rating value expressed as a percentage, which is used 
to quantify the amount of cracking based on the severity and extent noted during 
a visual inspection. 
 
Transverse Cracking: The transverse/thermal-cracking index is expressed as an 
index on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the best condition and 100 the worst. 
The index reflects the severity and extent of transverse cracking on a bituminous 
pavement. 
 
Rutting: The average rut depth of both wheel paths measured with a pavement 
profiler commonly recorded in millimeters. Rutting is characteristic of bituminous 
pavements. 
 
PSI: The Present Serviceability Index or PSI. This is a numerical value indicating 
the ride quality of the pavement. PSI is a function of roughness IRI, cracking, and 
rutting. PSI is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 characterizing the worst 
condition and 5 the best. 
 
Current NSI: The Nebraska Serviceability Index is recorded as value on a scale 
from 0 to 100, with 0 the worst and 100 the best condition. The number 
represents the relative condition of the pavement at the time of measurement. 
NSI is used to develop remaining years of pavement life.  
 
Percent Joint Seal: A factor measured for concrete pavement denoting the extent 
of joint seal failure at a sample site. 
 
Faulting: The average displacement at the longitudinal and transverse joints, 
commonly measured in millimeters. 
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 Specific indicators for particular pavement types falling below prescribed 
levels trigger various repair or rehabilitation practices under the NDOR’s 
pavement management plan (NDOR 2005).   
 
2.2 Current NDOR Construction Incentives/Disincentives  
 
 Current NDOR quality incentive programs for pavement are based upon 
pavement smoothness and quality of materials immediately after construction 
has been completed.  Smoothness provisions can be found in Section 502.08 
and Section 1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for 
Highway Construction.  Examples of payment adjustment factors for smoothness 
are illustrated in Table 1, while examples of payment adjustment factors for 
materials and workmanship are shown in Tables 2-5.  
If the initial profile index is 10.0 in/mi or less and bump removal is 
required, a second profilogram is taken after the bumps are removed (Table 1). 
The percent of pay for a profile index is then based upon the second profilogram 
subject to the limitations that follow.  If the initial profile index exceeds 7 in/mi, 
then, except for total removal and replacement, the maximum percent of pay 
after bump removal is limited to 100 percent. Percent of pay is based on a 
second run of the profilogram after bump removal.  The work of smoothness 
testing is paid for at the lump sum unit price specified in the contract. This price is 
considered to be full compensation for all smoothness testing as set forth in the 
specification (NDOR 2007) 
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Table 1 – The NDOR’s Payment Adjustment Schedule for Asphalt Pavement 
Smoothness. 
 
 
Payment Adjustment Schedule 
 
Profile Index 
Inches Per Lane Mile 
Percent of 
Contract Prices 
0 to 2.0 inches 105.0 
More than 2.0 to 4.0 inches 102.0 
More than 4.0 to 5.0 inches 101.0 
More than 5.0 to 7.0 inches 100.0 
More than 7.0 to 8.0 inches 98.0 
More than 8.0 to 9.0 inches 95.0 
More than 9.0 to 10.0 inches 90.0 
More than 10.0 inches Corrective work required 
 (Source: Section 502 – Asphaltic Concrete Pavement Smoothness from NDOR Supplemental 
and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction) 
 
Pay factor for smoothness of the top layer of asphaltic concrete is 
determined according to the following formula: 
PF =  A (1.05) + B (1.02) + C (1.01) + D (1.00) + E (0.98) + F (0.95) + G (0.90) 
A + B + C + D + E + F + G 
Where:  
A = length of pavement with a profile index of 0 to 2.0 
B = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 2.0 to 4.0 
C = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 4.0 to 5.0 
D = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 5.0 to 7.0 
E = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 7.0 to 8.0 
F = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 8.0 to 9.0 
G = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 9.0 to 10.0 
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Table 2 illustrates the NDOR’s pay factors for asphalt materials.  Payment 
is based upon the top layer of the driving lane asphalt cement and asphaltic 
concrete.  Plan thickness is adjusted according to the schedule and payment 
criteria shown in Table 3.  Adjustments are calculated based on 0.1 mile sections 
measured by the profilograph (NDOR 2007). 
 
Table 2 – The NDOR’s Pay Factors for Asphalt Materials 
.   
Asphalt Materials – Pay Factors 
 
Specified Property Pay Factor* 
Upper Limit Lower Limit 
1.00 + 1% to 10%  
0.95 Greater than +10% to 
+15% 
Less than -10% to -15% 
0.90 Greater than +15% to 
+20% 
Less than -15% to -20% 
0.80 Greater than +20% to 
+25% 
Less than -20% to -25% 
0.70 Greater than +25% to 
+30% 
Less than -25% to -30% 
0.40 or Reject Greater than +30% Less than -30% 
* If the resultant pay factor for the material is less than 0.70, the material shall be rejected if not already 
used. If incorporated in any work which is judged to be unsatisfactory, the material shall also be rejected. 
 
* If the pay factor is less than 0.70 and the material has been incorporated in work which is allowed to 
remain in place, the pay factor for the material shall be 0.40. 
(Source: Table 503.01 A Asphalt Materials – Pay Factors from NDOR Supplemental and Standard 
Specifications for Highway Construction) 
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Table 3 – The NDOR’s Applicable Properties for Asphalt Pavement 
 
 
Applicable Properties 
 
 Asphalt Cement 
 
Asphaltic Oil Emulsified Asphalt 
Property Viscosity 
Grade 
 
Penetration 
Grade 
Original 
Material
Distillation 
Residue 
Original 
Material 
Distillation 
Residue 
Viscosity 
 
X¹  X  X³ X 
Penetration 
 
X X¹  X  X² 
Distillation 
to 435°F 
  X    
Distillation 
to 500°F 
  X    
Distillation 
to 600°F 
  X    
Percent 
Residue 
  X  X  
Float  
Test 
     X 
Absolute 
Viscosity 
     X 
Softening 
Point 
     X 
¹ Original material and thin film residue. 
 
² Penalties cannot be based on tests made on Residue by Evaporation. 
 
³ No penalties will be assessed if more than 1 day has elapsed between the sampling 
and the testing of the material. 
(Source: Table 503.01B Applicable Properties from NDOR Supplemental and Standard 
Specifications for Highway Construction)  
 
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate specific NDOR material pay factors which can serve as 
incentives or disincentives.  Pay factors based upon pavement density attempt to 
measure quality of both materials and workmanship (NDOR 2007).   
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Table 4 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Density of Compacted 
Asphaltic Concrete (First Lot) 
 
Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted 
Asphaltic Concrete (First Lot) 
Average Density (5 Samples, 
Percent of Voidless Density) 
Pay Factor 
 Greater than 90.0  1.00 
 Greater than 89.5 to 90.0  0.95 
 Greater than 89.0 to 89.5  0.70 
 89.0 or Less  0.40 or Reject 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Table 1028.21 Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic Concrete (First 
Lot) from NDOR Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction)  
 
 
Table 5 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Density of Compacted 
Asphaltic Concrete (Subsequent Lots) 
 
Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic 
Concrete (Subsequent Lot) 
Average Density (5 Samples, 
Percent of Voidless Density) 
 
Pay Factor 
 Greater than 92.4  1.00 
 Greater than 91.9 to 92.4  0.95 
 Greater than 91.4 to 91.9  0.90 
 Greater than 90.9 to 91.4  0.85 
 Greater than 90.4 to 90.9  0.80 
 Greater than 89.9 to 90.4  0.70 
 89.9 or Less  0.40 or Reject 
 
(Source: Table 1028.22 Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic Concrete 
(Subsequent Lot) from NDOR Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway 
Construction)  
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2.3  The NDOR’s  Incentive Program for Superpave Asphaltic Concrete 
  
Acceptance and pay factors for Asphaltic Concrete Type SPS are based 
on compacted in place average density.  Acceptance and pay factors for 
Asphaltic Concrete Type SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4, SP4 Special and SP5 are based 
on single test air voids, running average air voids, compacted in place average 
density, and production tolerances pay factors (NDOR 2004).  Examples of 
Superpave production tolerances and acceptance factors are shown in Tables 6 
and 7.  
 When there is a production tolerance pay factor penalty, the penalty 
percentage is subtracted from the percent pay for single test air voids for each 
sublot affected.  These three individual pay factors are then multiplied by each 
other to determine a total pay factor for each sublot [(750 tons) (680 Mg)]. 
  When any single test result on the same mix property from two 
consecutive QC samples falls outside the allowable production tolerances of 
Table 6, the material represented by these tests can either be accepted with a 
20% penalty or rejected at the discretion of the project Engineer (NDOR 2004). 
 
Table 6 – The NDOR’s Production Tolerances* 
 
Test 
Allowable Single Test  
Deviation from Specification 
Voids in the Mineral Aggregate - 0.75% to + 1.25% from Min. 
Dust to Asphalt Ratio None  
Coarse Aggregate Angularity - 5% below Min. 
Fine Aggregate Angularity - 0.50% below Min. 
*These tolerances are applied to the mix design specification values, not the 
submitted mix design targets. 
 
(Source: Table 1028.19 Production Tolerances of Superpave Asphaltic Concrete from Section 
1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction, 
revised 3-22-04)  
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Table 7 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Asphaltic Concrete Air 
Voids 
 
 
Acceptance Schedule 
Air Voids - Ndes
Air voids test results 
Moving average of 
four 
Single test 
Less than 1.5% Reject Reject 
1.5% to less than 2.0% Reject 50% 
2.0% to less than 2.5% 50% or Reject 95% 
2.5% to less than 3.0% 90% 95% 
3.0% to less than 3.5% 100% 100% 
3.5% to 4.5% 102% 104% 
Over 4.5% to 5.0% 100% 100% 
Over 5.0% to 5.5% 95% 95% 
Over 5.5% to 6.0% 90% 95% 
Over 6.0% to 6.5% 50% or Reject 90% 
Over 6.5% to 7.0% Reject 50% 
Over 7.0% Reject Reject 
       
(Source: Table 1028.20 Acceptance Schedule Air Voids - Ndes of Superpave Asphaltic Concrete 
from section 1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway 
Construction, revised 3-22-04)  
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2.4  Other Agency’s Construction Incentives/Disincentives 
 
Although many proposed roles for performance standards go well beyond 
current highway construction practices, performance standards for highway 
construction are nothing new. Because pavement smoothness is widely 
recognized as important from a standpoint of both user satisfaction (no one likes 
to drive on a rough road) and long-term performance (smooth roads last longer 
and are often of higher overall quality than rough roads), performance standards 
for pavement smoothness have seen widespread use (Carpenter, et al. 2003). 
Most highway agencies use smoothness specifications of one form or another. 
These specifications establish target values for smoothness measured using 
standard engineering test methods that are related to user perceptions. Many 
agencies include incentives and/or disincentives to encourage achievement of 
the high levels of smoothness that result in reduced operating costs for highway 
users and reduced maintenance costs for the owner agencies. Current 
performance standards for smoothness and the results obtained from specifying 
performance standards are illustrated by examples from Arizona, Virginia, and 
Kansas (Richter 2004).  
 
Arizona 
For new construction, Arizona has established a target International 
Roughness Index (IRI) value of 41, with smoothness expressed in inches per 
mile. Incentives are earned for values below 38 and disincentives are assessed 
for values in excess of 48.  For rehabilitation projects, the target, incentive, and 
disincentive values vary as a function of highway type, the nature of the work to 
be performed, and (in some cases) the smoothness of the existing pavement. 
Target smoothness is 39 to 68, while the thresholds for incentives vary from 37 to 
66 (target value minus 2) and the threshold for disincentives varies from 49 to 78 
(target value plus 10). 
 Removal and replacement (as opposed to other corrective actions) is 
required for smoothness values that exceed the target plus 45.  In general, 
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typical pavement smoothness incentives paid by the Arizona DOT average 
approximately $7,500 per lane mile or approximately $1.00 per square yard. 
Average contractors in Arizona produce IRI smoothness values in the mid 
thirties. Some very good contractors consistently achieve IRI smoothness values 
in the low thirties, with substantial areas often in the twenties (Richter 2004).  
 
Virginia 
Virginia has smoothness provisions for new construction and maintenance 
resurfacing, with smoothness expressed as IRI in inches per mile. For new 
construction, 100% payment is awarded for an IRI between 55 and 70 inches/ 
mile. Bonus payments are earned for achieving IRI values less than 55 
inches/mile and penalties are incurred for IRI values greater than 70 inches/mile, 
to a maximum of zero payment at IRI values greater than 160 inches/mile. 
Corrective action is required when the average IRI for a section exceeds 100 
inches/mile (Richter 2004).   
 For maintenance resurfacing, a maximum 10 percent bonus based on the 
asphaltic concrete (AC) surface cost is possible for interstate highway sections 
with an IRI less than 45 inches/mile and for non-interstate roads with an IRI less 
than 55 inches/mile.  Additionally, full payment is reserved for interstates with IRI 
from 55 to 70 inches/mile, while non-interstates must have an IRI between 65 
and 80 inches/mile for full payment (Richter 2004).   
Unlike new construction projects, most resurfacing projects are tested 
prior to and after paving. These projects can be either a straight overlay or a mill-
and-replace. Before-and-after testing is used to determine the amount of 
improvement in ride quality. If the contractor is able to improve the quality by 
more than 30%, the contractor is guaranteed full payment for smoothness. 
For new construction, the contractor can receive an incentive of up to five 
percent based on IRI results. The amount of the incentive is based the total 
quantity of all asphaltic concrete used.  Maintenance resurfacing contracts allow 
up to a ten percent bonus. This amount is based on the cost of surface layers 
only. (Richter 2004)   
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Virginia has been actively using a ride special provision since the late 
1990s. Most of the ride data have been collected on maintenance resurfacing 
projects. With more than 150 projects in 2002, the average IRI on interstates was 
60 inches/mile. For non-interstate routes, the average was 67 inches/mile on 
U.S. routes and 74 inches/mile on State routes. Over the last six years, the 
average IRI on the interstates has stabilized while ride quality on non-interstate 
routes continues to improve (Richter 2004). Analysis of the 2003 ride quality is 
currently being conducted. 
In addition to improved ride quality, Virginia has seen other benefits 
through use of performance based provisions. During the mix-design process, 
contractors have developed mixes that better balance mix production costs and 
level of construction effort to achieve good quality field placement. These custom 
mixes result in better ride, better density, less tendency to segregate, less 
permeability, and more liquid asphalt for durability. When the ride special 
provision is applied on a project, more attention to detail is required throughout 
the paving process. Use of a materials transfer vehicle, continuous feed of 
material, no stopping of the paver, and proper rolling techniques are examples of 
techniques employed to improve ride quality.  The use of the ride special 
provision provides monetary incentives to the contractor and longer lasting 
pavements for the taxpayer (Richter 2004).  
 
Kansas 
With smoothness expressed as profile index in millimeters/kilometer 
(mm/km), Kansas specifications, in general, require an average profile index of 
475 mm/km or less per 0.1 km section as measured with a California-type 
profilograph. (Richter 2004). An exception is made for ramps and acceleration 
and deceleration lanes.  A profile index of 630 mm/km or less is required at these 
locations. In addition, PCC pavement areas within each section having high 
points with deviations greater than 7.5 mm and flexible pavement areas within 
each section having high or low points with deviations greater than 10 mm in a 
length of 7.5 meters are to be corrected regardless of the profile index.  These 
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efforts seem to be working, especially for asphalt pavement.  Figure 1 shows a 
historical summary of pavement smoothness in Kansas.  Note the increase in 
percentage of asphalt pavement with smoothness between 0 and 160 mm/km 
between 1991 and 2001. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Smoothness of New Pavement Constructed in Kansas 1990-2002 
(Source: Richter 2004) 
 
Pay adjustments are based on the average profile index determined for 
the sections prior to any corrective work (such as grinding). If the contractor 
elects to remove and replace the sections or overlay pavement to meet the 
smoothness specification, pay adjustments are based on the average profile 
index obtained after replacement or overlay.  Table 8 shows the schedule used 
to adjust payments for flexible pavement quality in Kansas. 
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Table 8 – Kansas Schedule for Adjusted Payments – Flexible Pavements 
 
 
Average Profile Index 
(mm/km per lane per 0.1 km section) 
Contract Price Adjustment 
(per 0.1 km section per lane) 
110 or less +$100.00 
111 to 160 +$50.00 
161 to 475 0.00* 
476 to 630 0.00* 
         (Source: Richter 2004)  
* Correct to 475 mm/km (630 mm/km for ramps, acceleration and deceleration 
lanes) 
 
Although some fluctuation has occurred from year to year, Kansas has 
seen a substantial increase in the percentage of pavements built with high levels 
of smoothness (0 to 240 mm/km for PCC pavements and 0 to 160 mm/km for 
flexible pavements).  
 
2.5 Management of Long-Term Pavement Performance through Warranties 
 
 
Warranty specifications are one type of performance specification that has 
received more attention in recent years.  When using warranty specifications, a 
transportation agency specifies pavement performance only; the contractor must 
warrant the performance of the pavement over a specific amount of time.  This 
warranty period normally extends two to seven years for asphalt pavements, 
although some warranties have been written for periods up to twenty years for 
concrete pavement.  During the warranty period, any defects attributable to 
construction practices or materials are repaired at the contractor’s expense.  
States that have used or are currently using pavement warranties are shown in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 – Use of Pavement Warranties in the United States 
(Source: www. fhwa.dot.gov.Pavement/warranty/background.doc 
 retrieved January 21, 2007) 
 
There are two basic types of construction warranties, materials and 
workmanship and performance.  A materials and workmanship warranty 
addresses the quality of pavement immediately after construction while a 
performance warranty addresses pavement quality at some point in time in the 
future.  Performance warranties are typically referred to as a "warranty 
specification" for pavements (WSDOT 2002). 
Almost all HMA pavement construction is covered by a short duration 
(usually one year) materials and workmanship warranty.  This type of warranty 
assigns risk to the contractor for following transportation agency specifications in 
regards to materials and workmanship.  If a problem or defect is detected within 
the warranty period, the transportation agency usually uses some type of forensic 
analysis to determine the cause.  If it is determined that specification non-
compliance caused the problem, the pavement is repaired at the contractor's 
expense.  If unexpected traffic volume or changed conditions caused the 
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problem, the transportation agency assumes financial responsibility for the repair 
costs.  This type of warranty is almost universal, rarely collected on, and is 
usually covered by sureties at no additional charge to the contractor. 
 A performance warranty assigns a longer portion of the pavement 
performance risk to the contractor.  During the warranty period, the transportation 
agency continues to monitor pavement performance. Throughout the warranty 
period, any performance below defined limits attributable to construction methods 
or materials must be remedied at the contractor's expense.  Because the 
contractor assumes greater risk, he/she is allowed to control most aspects of 
construction. 
For specifying transportation agencies, warranties represent progress over 
end-result specifications because warranties enumerate specific standards for 
actual pavement performance rather than material characteristics that are only 
indicative of pavement performance.  Table 9 shows an example of performance 
standards developed by the Indiana DOT.  Warranty specifications are more 
capable of aligning the sometimes competing influences of economic incentives, 
innovation, customer requirements and pavement quality.  This alignment, when 
achieved, allows market forces and economics, rather than construction 
specifications alone, to drive pavement quality (NCHRP 2001). 
 
Table 9 - Indiana DOT Pavement Performance Thresholds for a Five Year 
Warranty Specification  
Parameter Threshold Value (contractor must take 
action above this value) 
IRI 2.1 m/km (133 inches/mile) 
Rut depth 9 mm (0.375 inches) 
Surface Friction average of 35 but no single section < 25 
Transverse Cracking Severity 2 (as defined by the Indiana DOT) 
Longitudinal Cracking 5.5 m (18 ft.) per 152.5 m (500 ft.) section 
       (Source: Washington State DOT, 2002) 
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Although warranty specifications are being used in other countries, most 
notably in Western Europe, they are used only sparingly in the United States for 
several reasons.  First, U.S. paving contractors have been very reluctant to 
assume greater risk.  Second, the Federal Government places certain legal 
restrictions on warranty use.  Third, performance testing requires further 
development so methods are proven accurate and test results can be used to 
legally invoke warranty clauses.  Finally, the surety industry may have the largest 
say in the extent to which performance based incentives will be adopted in the 
United States.  Transportation agencies commonly limit their risk by requiring a 
contractor be bonded.   Bonding agencies may or may not be willing to accept 
the risk associated with a two to seven year performance warranty.  Sureties are 
especially wary when contractors have little to no say in pavement design and no 
control over post-construction pavement use (WSDOT 2002).  
A few state highway agencies have used both asphalt concrete and 
Portland cement concrete pavement warranties for many years. Under a 
pavement-warranty specification, quality is measured by the actual performance 
of the pavement as opposed to the properties of pavement materials and 
methods of construction. Pavement warranties require the construction 
contractor to guarantee the post-construction performance of the pavement. The 
shifting of post-construction performance risk from a state highway agency to a 
contractor is perceived to reduce premature pavement failures, reduce costs, and 
increase pavement quality.  However, for most contractors to feel comfortable 
with assuming the increased risk associated with a pavement warranty, some 
type of monetary incentive must be provided (TRB 2005a). 
Some states that use pavement warranties have reported a reduction in 
costs and an improvement in quality, while others have not. For example, the 
Wisconsin DOT has reported a significant quality increase and overall cost 
reduction through the use of five year performance warranties for asphalt 
concrete pavements (TRB 2005a). However, an evaluation of three year 
workmanship and materials warranties completed by the Colorado DOT showed 
no discernible impact on quality or cost (TRB 2005a). 
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2.6 Other Initiatives toward Management of Long-Term Pavement 
Performance. 
 
The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) currently uses 
Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) contracting on a project-by-project basis. Currently, 
the selection process is proactive towards the needs of each project rather than a 
standard procedure based on a set of established guidelines. ODOT is 
attempting to develop a process to assist the selection of I/D contract methods 
with associated values and timeframes based on guidelines or standards that 
have been developed within the construction industry. With the continued 
evolution of using both insourced and outsourced project delivery at ODOT, the 
I/D process needs to be flexible, encompassing a wide range of problems and 
issues associated with both preliminary engineering and construction 
engineering. The implementation of such a process will require substantial 
support and documentation. The information will need to be highly organized and 
articulate the elements of cost, schedule, quality and public support associated 
with a particular I/D clause (TRB 2004). 
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) has used 
various incentives in paving contracts for many years but reached no conclusion 
as to whether incentives influence the quality or outcomes of a project. An 
assessment of performance based contracting is currently examining the bidding 
process, impacts on contractors and agency personnel and project outcomes. 
This research will assist WSDOT in determining whether to increase or decrease 
the use of performance incentives in WSDOT pavement contracts (TRB 2005b). 
A research project is currently investigating the effectiveness of using 
alternative contracting techniques on Florida Department of Transportation 
(FDOT) construction projects. The research is comparing relevant performance 
factors for traditional Design-Bid-Build projects with those of the following 
alternative contracting techniques: A+B, Incentive/Disincentive, Design-Build, No-
Excuse Bonus, CM at Risk, and Lump Sum. The comparison will include the 
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overall delivery from concept to completion for each technique. The specific 
performance measures to be considered are comparison of initial estimates, 
contractors price proposal, final estimate, original contract time, final contract 
time, project quality, overall value, and administrative costs. The desired 
outcome of this research is a definitive statement on the applicability of 
alternative contracting techniques on FDOT construction projects. Additionally, 
this research is evaluating strategies intended to standardize the alternative 
contracting techniques, including training opportunities (TRB 2006). 
State departments of transportation are under increasing pressure to 
reduce the duration and cost of highway construction projects. This pressure 
stems from the desire to reduce traffic delays and other inconveniences to the 
traveling public. To reduce the duration of construction projects, many state 
highway agencies have turned to the use of time-related incentive and 
disincentive contract provisions. A better understanding of the use of time-related 
incentives and disincentives in highway construction contracts is needed. 
Specifically, the following items require further research:  
(1) The types of time-related incentive and disincentive contract provisions 
used in highway construction contracts and the extent to which they are used.  
(2) The success of time-related incentive and disincentive contract 
provisions.  
(3) Criteria used to determine when time-related incentive and disincentive 
contract provisions are appropriate and criteria to select the most appropriate 
provisions.  
(4) Methods used to determine the dollar amount of the time-related 
incentives and disincentives.  
(5) The effects of time-related incentives and disincentives on project 
completion. The objective of this research is to develop recommendations for 
effective use of time-related incentive and disincentive provisions in highway 
construction contracts (TRB 2005c).  
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS 
 
According to the National Cooperative Highway Research Program, true 
"performance-related standards": 
• are based on properties of the finished product, not on the processes used 
to produce it; 
• consider the variability inherent in the finished product and in the testing 
processes; 
• are based on attributes that have been related to the actual performance 
of the product through validated quantitative models; 
• incorporate sampling and testing procedures whose combined costs are 
consistent with the importance of the quality benefit being sought; and 
• make the contractor's payment dependent on how close the product 
comes to the level of acceptable quality (Volokh 1996). 
 
3.1  Proposed Pavement Performance Incentive Program 
 
Parameters used to measure the quality of long-term pavement 
performance must be understood by both construction personnel and the 
NDOR’s quality control technicians.  Guidelines with regard to which parameters 
should be evaluated for inclusion in the NDOR’s performance-based incentive 
program included the following: 
 
• Parameters should be one or more of those performance indicators 
currently being measured by the NDOR.  The NDOR measures a variety 
of performance indicators including various cracking indices, IRI, PSI, NSI, 
etc. 
• Parameters must correlate to an acceptable level of pavement 
performance at the time when the incentive will be assessed.   
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The research team originally proposed two sets of parameters, one for 
conventional flexible pavement and the other for Superpave, as shown in Table 
10. Table 10 was subsequently discussed with representatives from Dobson 
Brothers, Hawkins and Werner Construction at the University of Nebraska on 
November 17, 2006.   
 
Table 10 – Initial Performance-Based Incentives Proposed for Asphalt 
Pavement 
 
 Eligibility Criteria 
 
Incentive Parameter Payment - % of 
Contract 
Asphalt 
(Traditional) 
 
Profile Index ≤ 8 inches/mile 
 
Variance of asphalt binder content 
from design content (%) ≤ 0.25 
 
IRI ≤ 1.00 mm/m @ 2 yrs 
IRI ≤ 1.2 mm/m @ 4 yrs 
 
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 2 yrs 
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 4 yrs 
2.5 % @ 2 yrs 
2.5 % @ 4 yrs 
 
2.5 % @ 2 yrs 
2.5 % @ 4 yrs 
 
Asphalt 
(Superpave) 
Dynamic Shear(Original) ≥ 0.89 KPa 
Dynamic Shear (Residue) ≥ 1.95 
KPa 
Creep Stiffness ≤ 315 MPa 
Creep Slope ≥ 0.291  
Elastic Recovery ≥ 54 % 
IRI ≤ 1.00 mm/m @ 2 yrs 
IRI ≤ 1.2 mm/m @ 4 yrs 
 
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 2 yrs 
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 4 yrs 
2.5 % @ 2 yrs 
2.5 % @ 4 yrs 
 
2.5 % @ 2 yrs 
2.5 % @ 4 yrs 
 
 
Comments from the contractor representatives included:  
 
a. Four or five years is too long for contractors to wait for payment.  
Long-term performance of asphalt pavement can be reliably 
estimated after two or three years.  
b. Variance of asphalt binder content is probably not a good measure 
of quality of HMA pavement.   
c. Performance should be based upon measurements taken from the 
driving lane only.  Bridges, off/on ramps, etc. should be excluded.  
d. Payment should be based upon $/SY of materials placed during 
construction instead of a percentage of the overall contract or tons 
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of material emplaced.  Payment should be proportional to the cost 
of emplacing all layers (subgrade, base and wearing courses).   
e. The NDOR contracts for more partial depth rehabilitation/ 
reclamation projects rather than full depth.  Researchers had 
included full-depth replacement as a subcategory under traditional 
asphalt.  Proposed standards should be expanded to include all 
rehabilitation projects.  
f. Contractors would like to see a sample of flexible pavement 
projects completed, NDOR’s assessment of quality of those 
segments upon completion, and hypothetical payments contractors 
would receive based upon proposed performance parameters 
measured two or three years later.  
 
3.2 NDOR Suggested Modifications 
 
Researchers then met with NDOR representatives from Materials and 
Research Division and Construction Division on December 1st, 2006.  Comments 
from the NDOR personnel present at that meeting included: 
 
a. All asphalt pavement contracted by NDOR must now meet 
Superpave specifications, so traditional asphalt as a category could 
be deleted from the proposal.  
b. A discussion was held on the proposed standards of quality, 
specifically indicators for measuring pavement performance and 
whether IRI is indicative of quality for asphalt pavement.  The 
consensus was that IRI decreases as asphalt pavement ages, so 
IRI is irrelevant for measuring long-term quality.   
c. A similar discussion ensued reference cracking of asphalt 
pavement.  The consensus was that control of cracking is beyond 
control of the contractor (at least for many applications of asphalt 
pavement). Cracking may or may not be affected by quality of 
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materials used or by “laydown” procedures.  It should not be 
included as an indicator when measuring long-term pavement 
performance.  
d. Flushing was subsequently discussed.  Consensus was that 
flushing is affected by quality and quantity of binder used.  
However, flushing is not an indicator normally measured by the 
NDOR.   The NDOR has no published standards concerning what 
levels of flushing are acceptable and what levels are considered 
excessive.  Flushing in excess of 20% was thought to be excessive, 
but how frequently a measurement of flushing should be obtained 
for a given section of highway and method of documentation could 
not be agreed upon. The intent of this incentive program is to 
provide incentives only for factors which the contractor can directly 
control during the construction process.  Flushing may or may not 
be under contractor control.  Specific pavement segments will have 
to be manually evaluated for flushing if flushing is included as a 
proposed incentive.  
e. Rutting was the only proposed standard judged to be acceptable 
under a performance based incentive program.  Six millimeters was 
considered too high for the limit and two years was considered 
insufficient time to measure performance.  Consensus was reached 
that three years and four millimeters or less of rutting were 
acceptable standards of quality for a performance based incentive 
program.  
f. An extended discussion then took place on whether the NDOR 
wished to have eligibility criteria listed or whether the only eligibility 
criteria should be “selected by the NDOR”.   Consensus was that 
the NDOR does not intend to apply these incentive standards to all 
or even to a majority of asphalt paving projects.  Performance 
based incentives will be applied selectively only to specific projects 
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where the NDOR has a special interest in contracting for long-term 
quality pavement.   
g. Profilograph Pay Factor (PPF) and Material Pay Factor (MPF) were 
thought to represent good composite estimates of initial pavement 
quality.  Projects with below-average PPF and MPF would not 
normally be eligible for performance-based incentives, so these 
factors could be used as eligibility criteria.   
h. Consensus was that the same incentive(s) should apply to all 
asphalt pavement applications, whether new pavement, full or 
partial depth reclamation, rehabilitation or overlay.   
i. The NDOR requested that performance indicators shown in Table 
10 be condensed to reflect only one row of flexible pavement, with 
a standard of rutting < 4 mm measured at three years.  Flushing 
less than 20% was to be included in the final recommendation as 
well.  PPF and MPF > 100% should be listed as eligibility criteria.  
The proposed payment be based upon the NDOR’s current practice 
of paying for quantity of asphaltic concrete (in tons or Mg) placed 
as surface layers, not as dollars per square yard (or per square 
meter) as requested by the contractor’s representatives.   
 
3.3 Analysis of Projects Where Materials and Workmanship Incentives 
Were Paid 
 
Researchers then sought to investigate whether projects awarded 
incentives immediately after construction showed acceptable or better standards 
for long-term performance.  The NDOR was asked to provide data for asphaltic 
concrete projects in excess of five miles in length, which had been constructed 
during the past three years, where quality incentives had been paid for 
smoothness and/or materials and workmanship upon completion of construction.  
Three years provided time for post-construction performance to accumulate and 
be measured while length in excess of five miles indicated a significant paving 
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project.  Rational for the quality incentive specification rested upon the 
assumption that a project which failed to earn an incentive for quality of 
construction would probably not be an ideal candidate for good long-term 
performance.  Table 11 shows cost information concerning three asphalt paving 
projects approximately three years old that received materials and workmanship 
incentives from the NDOR for pavement quality.  All projects involved Superpave 
specifications for asphalt.  Three different types of construction incentives were 
paid for each project.   Table 12 shows rutting measured for these three projects 
over the first three years of their lifespan.   
 
Table 11 -  Projects Where Construction Incentives Were Paid 
 
 
Control 
Number 
Smoothness 
Incentive Pay 
Factor 
Additional 
Incentive 
Pay Factor 
Quantity Incentive 
Paid 
Smoothness Incentive - Performance Graded (PG) Binder 
60937 Not Available $5.94 776.92 Mg $4,614.92 
31345 104.06% $6.46 522.08 Tons $3,372.64 
60893 100.75% $2.04 248.298 Mg $506.03 
Smoothness Incentive – Asphaltic Concrete 
60937 Not Available $0.84980 17,544.60 $14,912.91 
31345 104.06% $750000 12,733.75 Tons $9,550.30 
60893 100.74% $0.14800 4,281 Mg $633.59 
Superpave Quality Incentive (Air Voids) 
60937 Not Available $0.90 51,729.62 Mg $46,400.99 
31345 103.54% $0.66 25,229.950 Tons $16,651.77 
60893 Not Available $0.68 25,807.04 Mg $17,419.75 
Total Construction Quality Incentive Paid 
60937    $65,928.82 
31345    $29,574.71 
60893    $18,559.37 
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Table 12 – Analysis of Pavement Performance Over Three Years 
 
 
HWY 
BEG 
REF 
POST 
NUM 
END 
REF 
POST 
NUM 
CNTRL 
NUM 
WRK 
DESC 
DT 
COMP
LTD 
AVG 
RUT
D 
2003 
AVG 
RUT
D 
2004 
AVG 
RUT
D 
2005 
AVG 
RUTD 
2006 
IRI 
2006 
CRK
NG 
IDX 
2 258.04 270.32 60937 
GR 
CULV 
RESURF 
S-SHLD 
2002 0.75 1.43 1.6 2.4 0.8 1.7 
30 114.31 124.31 60893 GR STR RESURF 2003 0.3 3.39 3.58 4.6 0.9 0 
275 31.91 39.31 31345 RESURF 2002 3.37 4.87 ND 4.5 1 5.5 
 
 28
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 
Based upon the meeting with contractor representatives, the meeting the 
NDOR’s Materials and Research Division and Construction Division personnel, 
and analysis of information in Tables 11 and 12, a proposal for a performance-
based incentive program for asphalt pavement was created and is summarized in 
Table 13.  Researchers initially intended to recommend a 5% incentive based 
upon total cost of asphalt paving materials for the project.  However, the 
incentive paid for construction quality varied on the three project analyzed from 
3.7% to 5.7%.  An incentive less than the construction quality incentive paid three 
years in the future would appear to be of little interest to most contractors, so a 
6% payment was recommended instead.  Six percent is only a recommendation.     
The actual percentage paid can be adjusted upward or downward by the NDOR 
until the level of interest displayed by contractors is sufficient to satisfy the 
NDOR’s needs.  Four millimeters of rutting during the first three years of 
pavement life remains the recommended standard based upon meetings with 
both contractor’s representatives and the NDOR.   Both the standard and/or the 
time period can be adjusted upward or downward as needs or conditions change.  
 
Table 13 – Proposed Performance Incentive(s) for Asphalt Pavement  
 
Asphalt Pavement Performance  
Eligibility Criteria Incentive Standards  When Measured Payment  
 
Profilograph Pay Factor > 100% 
  
 
Materials Pay Factor > 100% 
  
rutting < 4 mm 
 
 
flushing < 20% 
of paved surface 
 
3 yrs 
  
  
  
  
  
~ 6 % of asphalt 
pavement cost  
as determined  
by the NDOR  
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Table 14 illustrates how the proposed performance based incentive would have 
applied to the three projects analyzed in Tables 11 and 12.  Two of the projects 
would have been ineligible for the proposed performance based incentive as the 
measured value for rutting exceeded the maximum level three years into the 
pavement’s lifespan.   
 
Table 14 – Application of Performance Incentive to Three Projects 
 
Highway 
Number 
Control 
Number 
Total Cost  
of Asphalt 
Paving 
Distance 
(Miles) 
Average 
Rutting at  
3 Years 
Proposed 
Performance 
Incentives  
2 60937 $1,150,566 12.28 1.6 $69,034 
30 60893 $505,205 10 4.6 $0 
275 31345 $494,595 7.4 > 4.5 $0 
 
The proposed pavement performance incentive was never envisioned as 
being applied to all projects but only to projects where the NDOR wishes the 
resulting pavement to be of superior quality.  These situations might include 
roads where the volume of traffic is sufficient to make repair and/or rehabilitation 
exceedingly difficult or costly.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Results of this research can be used by NDOR to provide contractors with 
incentives to more closely control the quality of materials used in mixes and 
methods of construction for asphalt pavements.  Percentages or time periods 
associated with a specific incentive can be established by level of performance 
desired and adjusted to encourage the desired level of contractor participation in 
this process. 
The performance incentive system proposed is designed to align the 
objectives of paving contractors more closely with the objectives of the NDOR. 
Under this system, both the NDOR and pavement contractors will be interested 
in providing pavement that meets certain specifications upon completion of 
construction and performs well enough to continue meeting established 
standards for a period of time afterward. This system will highlight to contractors 
the need to use quality materials and methods and will also provide a positive 
financial incentive in later years for contractors who construct quality pavement. 
 A quality incentive program of this type based upon pavement 
performance could become a nation-wide trend. Many state transportation 
agencies are experimenting with pavement warranties, best value contracts and 
performance based contracting procedures in an attempt to procure higher 
quality pavement. A quality incentive program of the type proposed in this 
research has the potential to provide most of the benefits of these three 
programs at less than cost and certainly with less legal entanglements. 
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